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Ohio's Statute of Limitations
for Medical Malpractice
For the last seventy-five years the Supreme Court of Ohio has
taken small steps to reduce the harshness of Ohio's one-year statute
of limitations for medical malpractice.' The court's opinions have at
times intimated that the General Assembly should amend the statute
in a way more favorable to the injured patient-plaintiff.2 Impatient
with legislative inaction, the court has also fashioned small changes in
the malpractice statute of limitations by interpreting it liberally. 3 The
disagreement between the court and the legislature over the proper
balancing of interests behind the malpractice statute of limitations
has resulted in a confusing mesh of statutory law and judicial inter-
pretation. In 1975 the legislature finally amended the malpractice
statute of limitations, 4 but the changes stemmed from the perceived
medical malpractice crisis and must be categorized as favoring the
defendant-doctor.
This Note will attempt to clarify the law governing Ohio's medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations. First, it will examine the pre-
amendment law surrounding the statute, which still retains vitality
today. This will include the policy considerations that shaped the
pre-1975 law, the supreme court's interpretations of the malpractice
statute of limitations, and the ambiguities in the prior law that are still
troublesome. The second part of this Note will look at the policy
considerations underlying the 1975 changes, the provisions of the 1975
amendment, and the probable effect of the amended statute upon prior
law. Finally, an interpretation of the statute will be proposed which
would help to eliminate some of the confusion in this area and pro-
vide for a more equitable balancing of interests between physician
and injured patient.
I. OHIO'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS PRIOR TO 1975
A. Balancing of Interests
Traditionally, legislatures have enacted statutes of limitation in
order to protect defendants from stale claims, which are often encum-
bered by the disappearance of evidence, death of witnesses, and hazi-
1. See Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
2. Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971); Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp..
175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963); DeLong v. Campbell. 157 Ohio St. 22. 104 N.E.2d
177 (1952).
3. See Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
4. Medical Malpractice Act, Am. Sub. H.B. 682, § 1, [1975] Pages Ohio Legis. Bull. No. 3,
at 175 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1975)).
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ness of recollection. 5 The Ohio medical malpractice statute of limi-
tations is no exception. The Supreme Court of Ohio in Melnyk v.
Cleveland Clinic commented that "the defense of a 'stale' claim for med-
ical malpractice . . . [a]s in other fields of highly technical and inex-
act science . . . is unusually difficult to acquire and present."6 The
malpractice statute of limitations is also a statute of repose and is
intended to provide stability to the medical profession and society in
general .
On the other side of the scale is the diligent plaintiff's right to
have his malpractice action decided upon the merits. 8 Injuries re-
sulting from the doctor's act of malpractice may remain latent for a
long period of time and unascertainable to even the most diligent
plaintiff.9 If the malpractice statute of limitations is of short duration, a
patient may not discover the doctor's act of negligence until the stat-
ute has run. Thus, the policy considerations behind Ohio's medical
malpractice statute of limitations represent a balancing of these two
countervailing considerations-preventing stale claims and allowing
repose on the one hand, and equitable treatment of patients on the
other.
B. Court Interpretation of Ohio's Medical Malpractice
Statute of Limitations
In balancing these opposing interests the Ohio General Assem-
bly kept in force from 1894 to 1975 a malpractice statute of limita-
tions that simply read: "An action for . . . malpractice . . . shall be
brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued .... "10
The Ohio Supreme Court has never favored this statute and has at-
tempted to prevent harsh results by liberally interpreting the word
"accrued." In the landmark case of Gillette v. Tucker l the court dis-
missed the traditional view12 that the plaintiff's cause of action 3 for
malpractice accrued at the time of the physician's negligent act, and
5. See Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 Ono ST. L.J. 130, 133 (1955),
6. 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 200, 290 N.E.2d 916, 917 (1972).
7. See Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 171, 267 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1971).
8. See Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 433 P.2d 220, 222 (Haw. 1967).
9. See DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 31, 104 N.E.2d 177, 181 (1952) (Middleton,
J., dissenting).
10. The quotation is taken from the earliest codification. Ohio Gen. Code § 11225
(1910). This codification and those that followed are worded slightly differently than the session
law on which they are based. Act of May 18, 1894, Ohio H.B. No. 313, 91 Ohio Laws 299.
11. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
12. See, e.g., Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654-55 (1919).
13. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1970, replaced the term "cause of ac-
tion" with the term "claim for relief." Because the term "cause of action" has been used in
the prior decisions interpreting the malpractice statute of limitations and the term is still em-
ployed in the present malpractice statute of limitations, the phrase "cause of action" will be
used throughout this Note.
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instead held that the cause of action accrued at the termination of the
physician-patient relationship. 14
In Gillette the physician negligently left a cheesecloth sponge in
the plaintiff's abdomen during surgery, with the result that the incision
continued to discharge pus. The plaintiff visited the doctor for further
treatment and was told that the incision would heal in time. After a
year of this advice the plaintiff became impatient with the doctor and
accused him of negligently performing the operation. This angered
the doctor, who ordered the plaintiff out of his office "under a threat
that an officer would be called to eject [her]." 5 The plaintiff's action
would have been barred if the court had decided that the plaintiff's
action accrued at the time of the operation. Instead, the court found
an implied contract between physician and patient and held that the
physician had a continuing duty to exercise due care in effecting a
recovery from the time of the operation until the case was abandoned,
or the professional relationship terminated.
The court stated in a later case that this "termination rule" was
based upon the patient's "right to rely upon the surgeon doing such
things . . . as reasonable care and skill would require, and he has a
right to continue so to rely until the contract of employment is at an
end." 6  The court was also influenced by the policy that the physi-
cian should be given a reasonable time to correct his acts of malprac-
tice and that the termination rule was "conducive to that mutual con-
fidence that is highly essential in the relation between surgeon andpatient." 17
The rule announced in Gillette was unique, and a number of states
followed Ohio's lead in holding that the balance could be properly
struck by utilizing the termination rule.'8 Critics, however, recog-
nized that this rule commences the running of the statute of limita-
tions in a way that bears no rational relationship to the time of the
patient's discovery of his injury.' 9 Starting with the California Su-
preme Court in 1936,20 a number of courts and a few legislatures
14. It is not clear whether the statute begins to run at the termination of the physician-
patient relationship for the particular ailment that resulted in the malpractice, action, or
whether the statute runs from the termination of the professional relationship between patient
and physician for all medical care. See section II.C.I. infra. This Note will simply refer to
the doctrine announced in Gillette v. Tucker as the "termination rule."
15.: 67 Ohio St. at 121, 65 N.E. at 868.
16. Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 368, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (1919).
17. Id.
18. See De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Schmit v. Esser, 183
Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); Hotel-
ling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d
244 (1932).
19. Eg., Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 168, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971); 30 Onto ST.
L.J. 425, 430 (1969).
20. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). The full implications of
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attacked the problem by adopting the discovery rule.2 1  Under this
rule a cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time the patient
discovers or reasonably should discover the acts or omissions consti-
tuting the alleged malpractice.
In the 1952 decision of DeLong v. Campbell 2 the Ohio Supreme
Court made its first overture to the legislature to adopt the discovery
rule. In that case the defendant doctor negligently left a sponge in the
plaintiff's abdomen, but the incision healed properly. Thus, the plain-
tiff was not put on notice of the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff
discovered the act of negligence more than a year after the termination
of the professional relationship when she was treated for abdominal
pains by a second doctor. The plaintiff asked the court to adopt the
discovery rule. The court found "much persuasive force in this argu-
ment,"23 but directed the plaintiff to the legislature for the desired
change.24 The court said that the "balance of convenience or justice
as between the patient and the physician is a matter for determina-
tion by the legislative branch of the government and [the court] can
only interpret and enforce the statute as that branch has enacted it."25
This approach totally ignored the balancing of interests approach
implicitly taken in Gillette v. Tucker fifty years before.2 6
When the court decided Corpman v. Boyer" in 1960, eight years
had passed since the court had made its oblique suggestion to the leg-
islature, and the malpractice statute of limitations remained unchanged.
In Corpman the plaintiff's wife had consulted with the defendant-doc-
tor for diagnosis and treatment of a pain in her upper arm. The
plaintiff alleged that after an examination the doctor ordered her into
the hospital for what was understood between the parties to be a sim-
ple operation involving a nerve in the left arm. Instead, the defen-
dant performed a cordotomy, one of the most radical and dangerous
Huysman were not initially known. As the California Supreme Court continued to reline the
formulation, however, it became evident that the court had adopted the discovery rule for all
actions based on medical malpractice. See generally, Comment. A Four Year Statute of lidI-
tations for Medical Malpractice: Will the Plaintiff's Case Be Barred? 2 PAc. LJ. 663. 6654-6
(1971).
21. For a list of states that presently follow the discovery rule. see notes 146 and 148
infra.
22. 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
23. Id. at 27, 104 N.E.2d at 179.
24. The court stated that the creation of the statute of limitations was the prerogative
of the General Assembly. The court pointed to the statutes of limitation for underground
trespass and fraud and noted that the legislature specifically provided that the cause of action
in these instances did not accrue until the plaintiff discovered the fraud or underground tres.
pass. In the court's view the legislature could make the same type of provision for the mal-
practice statute of limitations if that were the legislature's intention, Id. at 27-29, 104 NE,2d
at 179-80.
25. Id. at 30, 104 N.E.2d at 180.
26. See DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 32, 104 N.E.2d 177. 181 (1952) (Middleton.
J., dissenting).
27. 171 Ohio St. 233. 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960).
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of all surgical operations to the spine. The operation was unsuccess-
ful, causing slight brain damage, and leaving the plaintiff's wife bed-
ridden and completely dependent upon others.8
Although both the victim and her husband commenced suit, the
wife's action for medical malpractice was barred because the suit was
commenced three years after the operation and more than one year
after the termination of the physician-patient relationship. The sole
question in Corpman was whether the husband's cause of action for
consequential damages resulting from medical expenses, loss of con-
sortium, and loss of services29 was also barred by the statute of limi-
tations. The plaintiff argued that Kraut v. Cleveland Railway Co.3°
had established that a husband's injury in this situation was a financial
and personal loss, independent of any claim that his wife might have
for her personal injuries; hence, in the present case as in Kraut, the
husband's action should be governed by the four-year general statute of
limitations. 31  The defendant countered that since the plaintiff-hus-
band would have to establish the defendant's malpractice to recover,
the one-year malpractice statute of limitations should control. His
view was supported by the fact that in some jurisdictions the statute
of limitations for the wife's action had been found to cover the hus-
32band's cause of action for consequential damages.
Presented with this persuasive authority on both sides of the
question, the court held that the four-year statute of limitations ap-
plied. It is conceivable that the court, impatient with the legislature
for failing to adopt the discovery rule, opted for the construction that
would reduce the harshness of the existing statute. In effect, the court
saved the malpractice action to the extent of the husband's conse-
quential damages.
In 1963 the Ohio Supreme Court again revealed its dissatisfac-
28. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3-5, Corpman v. Boyer. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d
14 (1960).
29. The term consequential damages was used by the Ohio Supreme Court in Corpman v.
Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960), to describe an action brought by one spouse to
recover damages for loss of services, loss of consortium, and medical expenses caused by the
defendant's alleged act of negligence upon the other spouse.
30. 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936).
31. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D) (Page Supp. 1975):
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought within four years after the
cause thereof accrued . . . (D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising
on contract, nor enumerated in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12, inclusive, 2305.14. and
1304.29 of the Revised Code.
32. Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N.E. 402 (1908); Rex v. Hutner, 20 N.J. 489. 140
A.2d 753 (1958); Maxson v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 112 N.Y. 559, 20 N.E. 544 (1889). In
Hergen v. Weintraub, 29 N.Y. Misc. 2d 396, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1961), the court found
that the husband's action for consequential damages stemming from an act of malpractice
upon his wife was governed by the time limitation that applied to his wife's suit. An Ohio
court of appeals, answering the precise question put forward in Corpman, found that the mal-
practice statute of limitations was controlling. Cramer v. Price, 84 Ohio App. 255. 82 N.E. 2d
874 (1948). Two commentators discussing Corpnian argued that the Ohio Supreme Court
reached the wrong result. See 6 VILL L REv. 422 (1961); 30 U. CiN. L. RB'. 253 (1961).
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tion with Ohio's malpractice statute of limitations in Lundberg v. Bay
View Hospital.3  The plaintiff, a young married woman, underwent a
hysterectomy after the defendant hospital's salaried pathologist
"grossly misinterpreted the biopsy material."34  When other physi-
cians conclusively determined that the plaintiff had never been af-
flicted with cancer of the cervix, the plaintiff brought suit against
the hopsital under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The incorrect
diagnosis occurred in April 1955 but the plaintiff continued to return
to the hospital for check-ups until February 18, 1956. The court held
that the plaintiff's action did not accrue until sbe terminated the pro-
fessional relationship with the hospital. Hence, her suit commenced
on February 16, 1957, was timely. The court did not decide whether
the action against the hospital was governed by the two-year statute
of limitations for bodily injuries35 or the one-year statute for malprac-
tice,36 for in either case the action was timely.
Even though the discovery rule was not urged upon the court,
Justice Gibson's concurring opinion in Lundberg advocated adoption
of the discovery rule either by judicial interpretation or by legislative
amendment.38 Justice Gibson's suggestion seemed to signal the
court's willingness to review and perhaps adopt the discovery rule not-
withstanding the legislature's refusal to act on the matter.
In Wyler v. Tripi,9 however, a four-to-three majority declined to
adopt the discovery rule and voted to reaffirm the termination rule.
The plaintiff, an elderly woman, fractured her hip in October 1965.
Her hip was pinned by the defendant, Dr. Tripi, at this time. The
plaintiff initially brought suit against the hospital, alleging the negli-
gence of a nurse-employee. 40 The plaintiff claimed that the nurse had
treated her carelessly while she was in a wheelchair, causing the pins
in her hip to bend and injure her further. In this first suit a verdict
was returned in favor of the hospital. On April 30, 1967, six weeks
after the unfavorable verdict in the first suit, the plaintiff claimed that
she had discovered for the first time the malpractice of Dr. Tripi.
Her second suit was filed well over a year after the termination of
the physician-patient relationship, but within a year of the time the
33. 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963).
34. Id. at 134, 191 N.E.2d at 822.
35. Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1954).
36. Id. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1975).
37. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13-14, Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133,
191 N.E.2d 821 (1963).
38. 175 Ohio St. 133, 137, 194 N.E.2d 821, 824 (1963) (Gibson, J., concurring),
39. 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
40. In Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964), an action against a
hospital based on the negligence of one of its nurses was held to be governed by Ohio Revised
Code § 2305.10, the two-year statute of limitations.
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plaintiff claimed she could have reasonably discovered the defendant's
negligence.
41
The court's reaffirmation of the termination rule was decidedly re-
luctant. The majority opinion noted that the strict application of the
statute of limitations to a situation "where no injury or damage be-
comes apparent contemporaneously with the negligent act . . . would
lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party's right to re-
covery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even
aware of its existence. ' 42  The court unabashedly conceded the in-
firmities of the termination rule:
[I]t affords little relief in cases where the injury is one which requires a
long developmental period before becoming dangerous and discoverable.
In those situations, the termination rule extends the period of time at
which the statute of limitations commences to run, but does so by a fac-
tor which bears no logical relationship to the injury incurred. . . . The
termination rule is further fallible in that it requires the patient to de-
termine at the time the relationship is terminated that malpractice has
taken place, when in fact he may have relied upon the very advice
which constitutes malpractice.43
Yet, the court reaffirmed the termination rule." While the court
felt that "there [was] much to recommend the adoption of the discov-
ery rule,"45 it again refused to adopt that rule. The court's decision
was based on the failure of the General Assembly to adopt any of the
recently proposed amendments to the malpractice statute of limita-
tions that would have extended the time for bringing a malpractice
46action. A dissent by Justice Corrigan attempted to circumvent the
conflict with the General Assembly by claiming that the General As-
sembly never "intended such a limited construction of the word 'ac-
crues,' which, in the present fact situation would operate to deny civil
redress." 47  Nevertheless, the majority of the court felt compelled to
defer to the perceived will of the legislature.
48
41. Supplemental Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 1-4, Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d
164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
42. 25 Ohio St. 2d at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Quoting from this portion of Ilyler v. Tripi, the plaintiff-appellant's brief in Melnyk v.
Cleveland Clinic commented: "How can it be said that that which is unconscionable...
harsh or fallible, is the law in this or any jurisdiction? Yet those were the words of the major-
ity used to condemn its own holding." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9. Melnyk v. Cleveland
Clinic, 32 Ohio St 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
45. 25 Ohio St. 2d at 170-71, 267 N.E.2d at 423.
46. None of the following bills got beyond the committee stage: H.B. No. 177, 101st
General Assembly (1955-56) (discovery rule); H.B. No. 907, 103d General Assembly (1959-60)
(eliminating the statute of limitations for all malpractice cases); H.B. No. 959, 105th General
Assembly (1963-64) and H.B. No. 30, 106th General Assembly (increasing the malpractice
statute of limitations to two years).
47. 25 Ohio St. 2d at 176, 267 N.E.2d at 426.
48. The brief for plaintiff-appellant in Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic argued that this reason-
ing was unconvincing-
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One year later, in a somewhat surprising move, the Ohio Supreme
Court adopted a limited discovery rule. In Melnyk v. Cleveland
Clinic49 the court held that when a foreign object was carelessly left
in the patient's body during surgery, the statute of limitations was
tolled until the patient discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered the doctor's negligence. The court found that the evidentiary
problems inherent in stale claims were not present. In the case before
them the evidence of the defendant's negligence was neatly preserved
in the patient's abdomen. The court said:
To carelessly leave a large and obvious metallic forceps and nonab-
sorbent sponge in a surgical patient's body is negligence as a matter of
law, and the proof thereof is generally unsusceptible to speculation or
error. . . .Furthermore, as problems of proof and defense dwindle, so
does the persuasiveness of the "stale claims" reasoning."
Although the court in Wyler v. Tripi had refused to modify the
existing statute of limitations because it believed that this change be-
longed in the domain of the legislature, in Melnyk a unanimous court
ventured into that very area.5" The court was going beyond past
holdings. In both Gillette v. Tucker and DeLong v. Campbell the
doctor carelessly left a foreign object in the plaintiff's body during
surgery, yet the cause of action was held to have accrued at the ter-
mination of the physician-patient relationship. In Meln k the court
noted that, to the extent the present decision conflicted with Gillette
and DeLong, those cases were disapproved.5 2  The court did not men-
tion that twenty years earlier in DeLong, in an almost identical fact
pattern, the court stated that the adoption of the discovery rule was
the prerogative of the legislature. In 1972 the court felt differently.
How then can this decision be justified? The authors seek refuge in the General
Assembly. They find that in the 101st, 103rd and 106th sessions of the legislative
body, bills were introduced to ameliorate the "unconscionable' rule, It was observed
that none of these bills ever cleared the committee to which they were referred. Thus
the voice of the people spoke and the Court was powerless to intervene,
To believe in this instance that the people of this State !,poke through their leg-
islative committee is to be naive indeed. Obviously the efforts of the medical profes-
sion, acting as a pressure group, prevented their reference out.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198. 290
N.E.2d 916 (1972).
49. 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
50. Id. at 200, 290 N.E.2d at 917.
51. Noting this move, the court in Simmons v. Riverside Methodist Hosp,, 44 Ohio App.
2d 146, 150, 336 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1975), commented that the Ohio Supreme Court had "seem-
ingly change[d] its game plan."
52. 32 Ohio St. 2d at 201 n.6, 290 N.E.2d at 918 n.6.
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C. Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Ohio's Medical
Malpractice Statute of Limitations
1. Termination of the Particular Treatment or of the
Professional Relationship Generally?
Even though the court's interpretation of the malpractice statute
of limitations has been fairly consistent since its decision in Gillette v.
Tucker, the court's formulation of the termination rule has been terse
and sketchy, leaving some important questions unanswered. No Ohio
case has precisely determined whether the cause of action for mal-
practice accrues at the date that the physician stops treating the pa-
tient for a particular injury or at the date of the last professional con-
tact between the physician and patient for any reason. While in all
reported Ohio decisions in this area the date of the final treatment
for a particular injury or malady has also been the date of the last con-
tact between the physician and the patient,5 3 it is very likely that situ-
ations will arise for which the two do not coincide.-
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. On January
2, 1965, physician A negligently set a broken bone in patient B's hand.
The bone did not heal properly. B continued to visit the doctor for
treatment to the hand until June 2, 1965, when the physician informed
B that he could do no more to improve the hand and that B would
have to live with a slight disability. B continued to visit A for gen-
eral health problems until January 2, 1966, when at a check-up A in-
53. See Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 351 N.E.2d 479 (1976); Melnyk v.
Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972); Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.
2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19 (1972); Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971): DeLong
v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361. 124
N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106. 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Simmons v. Riverside
Methodist Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 146, 336 N.E.2d 460 (1975); Pump v. Fox, 113 Ohio App. 150.
177 N.E.2d 520 (1961); Swankowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271. 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953);
Cramer v. Price, 84 Ohio App. 255, 82 N.E.2d 875 (1948); Truxel v. Goodman, 38 Ohio L. Abs.
113, 49 N.E.2d 569 (1942); Meyers v. Clarkin, 33 Ohio App. 165, 168 N.E. 771 (1929); Scarer '.
Lower, 25 Ohio App. 328, 158 N.E. 199 (1927); Netzel v. Todd. 24 Ohio App. 219, 157 N.E. 405
(1926); Woodgeard v. Miami Valley Hosp. Soc., 47 Ohio Misc. 43 (C.P. Montgomery Cty.
1975); Stewart v- Sachs, 27 Ohio Misc. 29, 266 N.E.2d 262 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cry. 1971). In
Morningstar v. Jones, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 440 (1940), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant-doc-
tor continued to treat her for obesity until the professional relationship terminated on August 3,
1937. The malpractice action was based on the physician's negligence in prescribing medication
for the plaintifis obesity. The defendant contended that he last treated the plaintiff for obesity
on June 29, 1936, but treated her for injuries stemming from an automobile accident from
February 16, 1937 to March 3, 1937, and that the plaintiff visited his office on August 3. 1937.
to pay the bill arising from medical care occasioned by the auto accident. The jury beliesed
the plaintiff, and the appellate court did not have to decide whether the contractual relationship
terminated at the date of final treatment for the particular disease or at the termination of the
relationship generally.
54. The question is of more than academic interest. The medical profession strenuously
argues that the statute runs from the date of the final treatment for a particular disease entit).
It contends that a doctor's duty to correct his negligence reasonably ends at the time that the
patient no longer complains about the particular ailment. However, the profession concedes
that the precise question has never been litigated in Ohio. Interview wvith D. Brent Mulgrew,,
Director of State Legislation, Ohio Medical Association in Columbus, Ohio (October 26. 1976).
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formed B that he was retiring from practice and, thereafter, B should
see physician D for any medical problems. A few months later on
July 2, 1966, while visiting physician D for a back problem, B was in-
formed by doctor D that physician A had been negligent in setting
the bone. Under the termination rule, did B's cause of action accrue
on June 2, 1965, or on January 2, 1966?
Some jurisdictions have resolved this precise issue." These juris-
dictions follow the termination of treatment rule announced in the
Minnesota decision of Schmit v. Esser.56  The Minnesota Supreme
Court articulated the termination of treatment rule as follows:
So long as the relation of physician and patient continues as to the par-
ticular injury or malady which he is employed to cure, and the physician
continues to attend and examine the patient in relation thereto, and
there remains something for him to do in order to effect a cure, it can-
not be said that the treatment has ceased. If there is nothing further to
be done by the physician in the matter, or if he ceases to attend the pa-
tient in relation thereto, the treatment ordinarily ceases, without any
formality.1
7
Thus, under the termination of treatment rule, the cause of action in
the hypothetical problem would accrue on June 2, 1965, when the
physician discontinued the treatment for the hand. Although this
answers the above question, the rule causes confusion in situations
in which it is difficult to determine when the treatment for a specific
ailment was discontinued.
5 8
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never clearly resolved this issue.
In Bowers v. Santee59 the Ohio Supreme Court appeared to say that
the contractual relationship between the physician and patient con-
tinued so long as the physician treated the patient for the particular
55. De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn,
354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W,2d 121 (1941); Hotelling v.
Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1932); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp.
1976).
56. 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931).
57. Id. (syllabus 2).
58. For example, in Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1975), the
plaintiff was operated upon in 1969 by Dr. A to remove a growth on his right flank. Dr. B
performed a biopsy, negligently misread it, and declared that the growth was noncancerous.
In 1970 the plaintiff was in an automobile accident and returned to Dr. A for treatment of an in-
jured knee. During this treatment the plaintiff complained of pain in the same area that had
been operated upon in 1969. In 1972, Dr. A ordered another biopsy, which Dr. B read correctly.
Dr. B admitted that he had erred in the 1969 reading and that the plaintiff had had cancer
since 1969. Plaintiff commenced a malpractice action against both doctors in 1974. Was Dr. A's
treatment of the plaintiffs knee in 1970 continuous treatment of the plaintiff's flank problem
when the plaintiff still complained of a pain in the right buttock? Was there continuous treat-
ment when there was a gap of twenty months between the 1970 visit for the plaintiffs knee in-
jury and the 1972 operation? The appellate court, rejecting the lower court's view that as a
matter of law there could not be continuous treatment under these circumstances, left the resolu-
tion of this question to the jury.
59. 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
[Vol. 38:125
STATUTE OF LIMITA TIONS
injury. Looking to the Gillette rationale,60 the court said: "[T]he
patient is still at liberty to rely upon the professional skill, care and
treatment [of the physician] to complete such recovery so long as the
surgeon continues his employment with reference to the injury.' 6 1
The syllabus in Bowers v. Santee, however, stated that "the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the contract relation is
terminated. 62 Thus, the syllabus did not limit the contractual rela-
tionship to treatment of a particular injury.
In both DeLong v. Campbell63 and Wyler v. Tripi" the court
stated in the syllabi that at the latest the statute of limitations begins
to run when the physician-patient relationship terminates." The court
did not restrict the "professional relationship" for accrual purposes
to treatment for a particular injury or malady. In DeLong the court
intimated that there was no such restriction: "The fact that plaintiff
did not know of her right of action did not prevent the statute from
running, and since the present action was commenced more than one
year after the termination of any professional relationship between
plaintiff and Campbell, it is barred by the statute of limitations.'"
The phrase "any professional relationship" suggests that the statute
commences when the patient discontinues being cared for by the doc-
tor for any medical problem. However, the phrase "at the latest,"
found in the syllabi of both DeLong and Wyler, implies that the court
leaves open the possibility that the statute of limitations may com-
mence running at an earlier time, perhaps at the termination of the
physician's treatment of the particular injury. Thus, the court's for-
mulations of the termination rule do not resolve the question.
60. Some of the confusion in this area has been caused by the supreme courts failure to
identify the rule by the same name. In Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361. 124 N.E. 238 (1919),
the rule was merely referred to as the "doctrine in Gillette v. Tucker." In Wyler v. Tripi, 25
Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971), the majority opinion consistently identified the doctrine
as the "termination rule." But perhaps the most confusing identification of the rule is found in
Justice Corrigan's dissent in Wyler v. TripL At one point his opinion stated: "As already noted
above this court has been committed to the rule that the termination of the physiclan.patlent
relationship is the event which starts the running of the statute of limitations." VWyler v. Tripi,
25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 174, 267 N.E.2d 419, 425 (emphasis added). From this identification it
would appear that the key event commencing the statute is the termination of the .professional
relationship. But two paragraphs later Justice Corrigan states: "By adopting the termination of
treatment rule this court avoided for the injured patient the harshness of the general rule that
a cause of action accrues at the time the tortious act is committed." 25 Ohio St. at 174, 267
N.E.2d at 425 (emphasis added). From this statement it would appear that the termination of
the particular treatment is the event that starts the statute running. It must be noted that no
majority opinion has ever referred to the doctrine as the termination of treatment rule.
61. 99 Ohio St. at 366, 124 N.E.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 361, 124 N.E.2d 238 (syllabus 2).
63. 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
64. 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
65. 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (syllabus); 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 164
(syllabus).
66. 157 Ohio St. at 27, 104 N.E.2d at 180 (emphasis added).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Reviewing the justifications for the termination rule, one also finds
arguments for either construction. In Wfyler v. Tripi the court stated:
The justification given for the termination rule is that it strength-
ens the physician-patient relationship. The patient may rely upon the
doctor's ability until the relationship is terminated and the physician
has the opportunity to give full treatment, including the immediate cor-
rection of any errors in judgment on his part.67
The patient is not penalized for delaying the commencement of his
legal remedies while he relies on the doctor to effect a cure by ad-
ministering a full treatment. Thus, for those who argue that the
statute would run from the final treatment for a particular injury, it
could be inferred that when that treatment is over, the patient's privi-
lege to forbear his legal action is over, and the patient must bring
suit within the period of the statute.
On the other side, it can be argued that so long as the relationship
continues at all, the physician has an opportunity to discover his error
and correct his negligence, regardless of the disease or injury being
treated. Since a physician has a continuing duty to discover his
negligence, 68 full treatment is never realized until the physician does in
fact correct his negligence.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of Ohio has consciously left the doc-
trine vague for the purpose of giving the lower courts discretion in
determining when the contractual relationship has terminated. In its
latest pronouncement on the doctrine in Wyler v. Tripi, the supreme
court held in the syllabus that the cause of action for medical mal-
practice accrues at the latest when the physician-patient relationship
finally terminates. By using the phrase "at the latest," the court
suggests that in some situations the cause of action will accrue be-
fore the termination of the physician-patient relationship. Also, the
majority opinion consistently labeled the doctrine the "termination
rule," not tying the rule to either termination of treatment or the pro-
fessional relationship. Perhaps it can be inferred from this language
that, depending upon the peculiar facts of the case, the lower courts
are to determine whether it is more equitable to commence the statute
at the termination of the treatment or at the termination of the profes-
sional relationship. This decision would be based on the type of
injury that resulted from the alleged malpractice, the treatments ad-
ministered by the physician, the frequency of the visits, and any other
particular circumstance that would make it more equitable to com-
mence the statute either at the termination of the treatment or at the
termination of the relationship.
67. 25 Ohio St. 2d at 167-68, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
68. See Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 126-27, 65 N.E. 865, 870 (1902),
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2. Date of Termination of Relationship
A second area of confusion concerns the exact termination date
of the medical relationship. Is it measured from the date of the last
office visit, phone call, or even refill of a prescription? In Pump v. Fox6)
a court of appeals held that if reasonable minds could differ on the
termination date, the issue of fact must be submitted to the jury for
determination. But the court laid down no guidelines for the jury to
consider.70 In Millbaugh v. Gilmore71 the supreme court gave some
guidance on this matter. The plaintiff failed to show up at a scheduled
appointment and never saw or contacted the physician thereafter.
The court found that reasonable minds could not disagree that, at the
latest, the termination date was the date of the missed appointment.
The fact that the plaintiff continued to take medicine prescribed by the
doctor for a full year after the missed appointment did not extend
the date of termination when the pills were taken without the physi-
cian's knowledge. The court said: "The taking of the medicine in such
an unsupervised manner neither afforded Dr. Gilmore an opportunity
to correct any errors on his part, nor provided a basis for the full treat-
ment contemplated in a physician-patient relationship."7
2
When termination of the treatment and termination of the rela-
tionship coincide and the only problem involves the exact date of the
termination, a two-step analysis follows from Millbaugh. First, on
what date did the doctor have the final opportunity to correct his
error? Second, when did the treatment specifically prescribed by the
physician end? In most instances the answer to both questions will
lead to the same date, since a physician generally reviews the patient's
progress at the completion of treatment. If different dates result
from these questions, the later date will probably mark the termina-
tion of the relationship. This would follow from the court's intimation
in Gilmore that if the patient had taken the pills under the doctor's
orders, the termination date would have been the final date of the
taking of prescribed pills. 73 The court did not expressly so hold, how-
ever, and a contrary holding could result.
69. 113 Ohio App. 150, 177 N.E.2d 520 (1961).
70. In Pump v. Fox the plaintiffs action for malpractice was commenced on June 9, 1958.
It was uncontroverted that the defendant-doctor had not rendered medical, surgical, or physical
treatment after August 1, 1956. However, the plaintiff had continued to consult wvith the defcn-
dant-doctor about her postoperative difficulty. The defendant and plaintiff used these consulta-
tions to discuss the treatments proposed by other physicians. The discussions centered, how-
ever, around the defendant's obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for these subsequent expenses,
which the plaintiff claimed were necessitated by the defendant's alleged act of malpractice in
his performance of a prior operation. The court held that it was a jury question %hether the
relation of physician and patient had continued during these consultations.
71. 30 Ohio St. 2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
72. Id. at 322, 285 N.E.2d at 21.
73. See Netzel v. Todd, 24 Ohio App. 219, 157 N.E. 405 (1926), in which the court found
that it was for the jury to decide whether the contractual relation between'surgeon and patient
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D. Summary of Pre-1975 Law
Prior to 1975, the law attempted to balance the right of the doctor
to repose and protection from stale claims against the diligent patient's
right to find legal redress for the doctor's negligence. An action for
malpractice was barred one year after the termination of the con-
tractual medical relationship between physician and patient; 4 how-
ever, in the case of foreign objects carelessly left within the patient's
body during surgery, the patient's cause of action accrued when the
patient discovered or reasonably should have discovered the physi-
cian's negligence. 75  The court never decided whether a hospital would
be given the benefit of the one-year statute of limitations when one of
its salaried physicians was guilty of malpractice. 76  A spouse's cause
of action for consequential damages stemming from an act of malprac-
tice upon the spouse's mate was governed by the four year catch-all
statute of limitations.
77
The Ohio Supreme Court left vague the formulation of the con-
tractual relationship between physician and patient, and equally strong
positions can be maintained that the statute begins to run either upon
the termination of the professional relationship or upon the termina-
tion of the treatment for the particular ailment. The supreme court has
given only a little guidance to the lower courts in deciding the exact
termination date of the contractual relationship.7 8  When the termina-
tion date of the treatment is also the termination date of the profes-
sional relationship, the court measures the termination date from either
the date of the doctor's final opportunity to correct his error or the date
that the doctor's specifically prescribed treatment ended, the termina-
tion likely being measured from the most recent date.
existed throughout the period during which the patient was taking pills under the prescription of
the surgeon.
74. Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
75. Melynk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972). See Wood.
geard v. Miami Valley Hosp. Soc., 47 Ohio Misc. 43 (C.P. Mo-itgomery Cty. 1975), in which
the court refused to apply the foreign object discovery rule against a physician who failed to
remove a piece of shattered glass while treating the patient's wounid. The court limited Mhltbvk
to cases in which the physician carelessly left a surgical instrument in the patient's body during
surgery.
76. Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963). In a suit
against a hospital for the negligence of its nurse under the doctrine of rcspondeat superior,
the court held the action was governed by the two-year statute of limitations for bodily injuries,
Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10, because a nurse cannot be guilty of medical malpractice,
Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964).
77. Corpman v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1963).
78. Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St. 2d 319, 285 N.F.2d 19 (1972).
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II. OHIO'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AFTER 1975
A. Policy Considerations Behind the 1975 Amendment
For twenty-five years the Ohio General Assembly ignored the
supreme court's proddings to amend Ohio's medical malpractice stat-
ute of limitations. The legislature was finally shaken from its
lethargy by the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the mid-
1970's. 79  The crisis appeared to threaten the quality and even the
availability of health care throughout the country. During this crisis
the General Assembly, like many other state legislatures, passed a bill
aimed at relieving the medical malpractice insurance crisis80 that in-
cluded a change in the statute of limitations.81
The malpractice insurance crisis added two more considerations
to the malpractice statute of limitations balance. First, the rising cost
79. See Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malprac-
rice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1432.
80. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 682 [1975] Page's Ohio Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 175 (codified at Onto
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1335.05, 1739.02, 2305.11, 2305.25, 2317.02, 2711.01, 2743.02, 4731.01,
4731.22, 4731.281, 2305.251, 2305.27, 2307.42, 2307.43, 2317.54. 2711.21-2711.24, 274343,
3929.482, 3929.71-3929.85, 4731.37 (Page Supp. 1975)).
81. OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1975) reads:
(A) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false im-
prisonment, or malpractice, including an action for malpractice against a physician
or a hospital, or upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, shall be brought ithin one
year after the cause thereof accrued, provided that an action by an employe for the
payment of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated dam-
ages by reason of the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime compensation, shall
be brought within two years after the cause thereof accrued.
If a written notice, prior to the expiration of time contained in this division, is
given to any person in a medical malpractice case that an individual is presently con-
sidering bringing an action against that person relating to professional services pro-
vided to that individual, then an action by that individual against that person may be
commenced at any time within one hundred eighty days after that notice is given.
(B) In no event shall any medical claim against a physician or a hospital be
brought more than four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged mal-
practice occurred. The limitations in this section for filing such a malpractice action
against a physician or hospital apply to all persons regardless of legal disability and
notwithstanding section 2305.16 of the Revised Code [provision tolling the statute of
limitations for those persons under the disability of minority, unsound mind, or impris-
onment], provided that a minor who has not attained his tenth birthday shall have until
his fourteenth birthday in which to file an action for malpractice against a physician
or hospital.
(C) A civil action for nonconsensual abortion pursuant to section 2919.12 of the
Revised Code must be commenced within one year after the abortion.
(D) As used in this section:
(1) "Hospital" includes any person, corporation, association, board, or authority
responsible for the operation of any hospital licensed or registered in the state, includ-
ing without limitation those which are owned or operated by the state, political subdi-
visions, any person, corporation, or any combination thereof. It does not include any
hospital operated by the government of the United States or any branch thereof.
(2) "Physician" means all persons who are licensed to practice medicine and
surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by the state medical board.
(3) "Medical claim" means any claim asserted in any civil action against a
physician or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
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of medical malpractice insurance was in part caused by the insurance
companies' inability to establish accurate actuarial tables.8 2  One re-
port concluded that the discovery rule and other doctrines that allowed
the patient to bring a malpractice action a number of years after the
negligent act helped to create the inaccurate actuarial tables.8 3 Thus,
there was pressure to change Ohio's termination rule and foreign ob-
ject discovery rule, which allowed some patients to bring a malpractice
action a number of years after the negligent act.
Second, there was a desire to reduce overall the number of mal-
practice suits. A short and rigid statute of limitations has the ob-
vious effect of barring a plaintiff's claim if he is dilatory in consulting
an attorney. It thus reduces the number of malpractice suits decided
upon their merits. As one report showed, the statute of limitations was
the most significant issue to the outcome in almost 12% of all mal-
practice actions.8 4  Hence, it was no surprise that the malpractice
insurers and the medical profession advocated an inflexible statute of
limitations that would bar malpractice claims after a certain date
regardless of discovery, termination date, or legal disability. The new
statute's four-year outside limit reflects this concern.
B. The Provisions of Amended Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11
At first glance amended § 2305.11 does not appear to differ sig-
nificantly from its predecessor, for malpractice actions still must be
brought within one year after the cause thereof accrues. Neverthe-
less, there are some important changes.
First, the second paragraph of § 2305.11(A) provides that if a
patient who is considering bringing an action against a physician for
malpractice gives written notice of that intention to the physician
within the one-year statutory period, then an action against that
physician will be timely if it is brought within 180 days after the notice
was given." This change has several effects. The notice may facili-
82. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELIFARE, RIP'OItT
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT].
83. Id. at 42.
84. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT Or
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE APPENDIX 128 [hereinafter cited
as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE APPENDIX].
85. S.B. No. 291, 110th General Assembly (1975-76), would have amended the malprac-
tice statute of limitations to bar malpractice actions two years after the cause of action accrued.
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 682 was adopted instead of S.B. No. 291.
86. Query when the notice will be deemed to have been given-upon mailing or upon re-
ceipt? Virginia's recently enacted malpractice statute of limitations makes mandatory the
notification of a physician or health care provider before suit can be instituted. The notice
tolls the statute of limitations when "delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail to tile
appropriate claimant or health care provider at his office, residence or last known address,"
VA. CODE § 8-919 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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tate a negotiated settlement before institution of legal proceedings.
The HEW Report on Medical Malpractice recommended this notice:
For the physician, such notice can give forewarning and possible rcsolu-
tion without court intervention in meritorious cases. For the patient,
such notice can produce prompt settlement, when warranted, without
the cost and delay of court trials. Thus such notice may result in a re-
duction of the number of malpractice suits brought.
8 7
Although under Ohio law the notice is not a prerequisite to the filing
of a complaint, the plaintiff's attorney will find it advantageous to
give notice if the statute has almost run. Thus, the notice should also
reduce the number of frivolous suits filed by attorneys who are pre-
sented with a questionable malpractice suit immediately before the run-
ning of the statute. Instead of hurriedly filing suit to beat the statute,
the lawyer need only send notice to the doctor of his client's intention
to sue. In the next 180 days the lawyer will have the chance to
investigate the merits of the case. If the lawyer determines that his
client's charges are without substance he can advise the client not to
bring suit.
81
The new statute also provides that it will govern an action for
malpractice against a hospital. Although the legislature has defined
"hospital," it is not clear just what types of cases are embraced by the
phrase, "a malpractice action against a hospital." Since in Ohio a
hospital cannot engage in the practice of medicine, 89 it can only be
guilty of malpractice through the acts of its servants. Also, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio has held that a nurse's failure to meet the
requisite standard of care constitutes negligence and not malpractice. 9
Thus, an action for malpractice against a hospital is probably limited
to those situations in which a hospital's employee-physician commits an
act of malpractice.9 Whether a hospital will be deemed the em-
87. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 82, at 37.
88. If in the future Ohio should recognize a physician's cause of action against a lawyer
or patient who brings a frivolous claim against the doctor for malpractice, see, e.g.. Nathan v.
Berlin, unreported Illinois Circuit Court opinion, Cook County, this provision in § 2305.1 1(A)
would bear on the issue of the lawyer's justification for bringing suit. It gives the lawyer the
option and ability to investigate a questionable malpractice claim before the running of the
statute. The provision would tend to strip the law-yer of the defense to a counter suit that
he was forced to bring the suit before the running of the statute of limitations and did not have
the time to substantiate the story of his client.
89. Op. OHIO ATr'y GEN. No. 3197 (1962); Op. Oto ATT'y GEv'. No. 3031 (1962): Op.
OHIO ATT'Y GEN. No. 1751 (1952).
90. Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964). held that a nurse's acts
of negligence were governed by Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10, the statute of limitations for
bodily injury.
91. A footnote in Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 87 n.1, 351 N.E.2d 479,
481 n.1 (1976), appears to substantiate this position. The footnote reads in part:
[I]t is to be noted that this court has not judicially determined w'hether a hospital.
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior by reason of acts of a physician-
employee, has the benefit of the one-year limitation in R.C. 2305.11, as does the
physician-employee. . . .In Lundberg v. Bay View Hospital, although the lower
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ployer of the physician hinges on all of the facts of the particular
case; however, when the hospital hires the physician, pays him a salary.
and directs him to perform routine hospital medical services, it is likely
that the master-servant relationship will be found.
92
C. The Probable Effect of§ 2305.11(B)
Perhaps the most significant change in the malpractice statute of
limitations involves § 2305.11(B), which begins: "In no event shall any
medical claim against a physician or a hospital be brought more than
four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged malpractice
occurred." 93 This provision appears to set an absolute outer limit of
four years beyond which no action for malpractice may be brought.
There is little doubt that the legislature was persuaded by the medical
malpractice insurers' and the medical profession's argument that an
absolute cut-off date for malpractice actions was necessary to develop
sound actuarial tables and to prevent stale claims, particularly claims
involving acts of malpractice upon minors. Despite the mandatory
language of the four-year limitation, its relationship to certain tolling
statutes, the termination rule, and the foreign object discovery rule is
not altogether clear. The Ohio Supreme Court has also indicated that
subsection (B) will have ramifications in actions not directly governed
by § 2305.11, but which are associated with an act of malpractice.9'
1. Effect of§ 2305.11(B) upon Legal Disabilities
The legislature clearly intended the four-year bar of § 2305.11(B)
to apply to the claims of individuals under the legal disability of
minority, unsound mind, or imprisonment. The second sentence in
§ 2305.11(B) specifically states that the four-year bar applies "regard-
less of legal disability . . . provided that a minor who has not at-
tained his tenth birthday shall have until his fourteenth birthday in
which to file an action for malpractice . . . .", Thus, the legislature
intended that persons under the disability of unsound mind or imprison-
ment bring their action within four years of the alleged negligent act
or else be barred from maintaining an action. For minors, the legisla-
courts gave the hospital the benefit of R.C. 2305.11, this court specifically left open
such question. However, in Am. Sub. H.B. No. 682 effective July 28, 1975, wherein
substantial amendment was made to R.C. 2305.11, malpractice actions against
hospitals are expressly included within such section. [Citation; omitted].
92. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Stuart Circle Hosp, Corp. v,
Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939).
93. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
94. In a surprising development, § 2305.11(B) provided an added reason for barring a
husband's cause of action for consequential damages stemming from an act of malpractice
upon his wife. See section II.C.4. infra, discussing Amer v. Akran City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d
85, 351 N.E.2d 479 (1976).
95. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
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ture intended that the statute be tolled until the minor reaches his tenth
birthday, at which time the minor has four years to commence suit.
The application of § 2305.11(B) to persons under a legal disability
may violate the due process clauses of both the Ohio and United States
Constitutions96 because these persons may never have a full oppor-
tunity to commence and litigate their claims. Traditionally, legisla-
tures have enacted tolling provisions in this area because of the virtual
inability of legally disabled individuals to commence their action.
97
The mentally incompetent and the minor also have difficulty giving
accurate information to an attorney and testifying in court.98 Even the
appointment of a guardian or representative has been found insuffi-
cient to cure all of these disadvantages and remove the disability.99
Although Ohio law permits an imprisoned felon to sue,1°° the very fact
of incarceration makes client-attorney communications and trial ap-
pearances extremely troublesome. Hence, the commencement of a civil
action by an individual encumbered by any of these three legal dis-
abilities is very difficult.
The courts are very reluctant to strike down a statute of limita-
tions for reasons of due process.101 When assessing the constitu-
tionality of a statute of limitations under the due process clause, the
courts ask whether the statutory time is so short that it amounts to a
virtual denial of the right itself.10 2  If it is, the statute is unreasonable
and violative of due process. In resolving the constitutionality of
§ 2305.11(B) as applied to those under the legal disability of unsound
mind or minority, the Ohio courts will probably have to decide whether
in medical malpractice cases the rights of the legally disabled plaintiff
can be adequately protected by a guardian, so that the patient will
have had an opportunity to commence suit within the statutory time
without significantly burdening the full litigation of the claim. For
those individuals who are imprisoned, the court will have to decide
whether the circumstances of prison life and regulation are so restric-
tive as to deny the individual the opportunity to commence suit within
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Ono CoNsr. art. I § 16.
97. See Wolf v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
98. Id.
99. Id.; In re Gress' Estate, 28 Ohio Op. 268, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 172 (P. Ct. Montgomery
Cty. 1944).
100. In Neff v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100
(1952), the court refused to recognize the doctrine of civil death which takes away all of the
prisoner's civil rights. Absent a statute abrogating the imprisoned convict's right to sue, the
right exists. Also, article I, § 12 of the Ohio Constitution buttresses this right as it provides
that no conviction of crime shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
101. See Landgraffv. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 28 (1976).
102. Owen v. Wilson, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Ark. 1976). In Owen the court held that due
process was not violated when the plaintiff did not discover that the defendant had left a
surgical instrument in her abdomen within the two-year statutory time set for medical mal-
practice actions.
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the statutory time. The resolution of these questions is beyond the
scope of this Note.
2. Effect of§ 2305.11(B) on Saving Clause and Saving Statute
Section 2305.11(B) states specifically that it overrides the tolling
of the statute of limitations in -cases of legal disability; however, the
effect of § 2305.11(B) upon the "saving clause"' 10 3 and the "saving
statute" 104 was not set forth in the amended statute. The saving clause
tolls the statute of limitations whenever the defendant conceals him-
self within the state or leaves the state. 10 5 The saving statute allows a
plaintiff to recommence his case within one year from the time the
plaintiff's first attempt failed for reasons other than upon the mer-
its.' 0 6  Thus, either the saving clause or the saving statute might au-
thorize a malpractice action to be commenced more than four years
after the negligent act or omission.
A strong argument can be made that § 2305.11(B) should prevail
over both the saving clause and the saving statute. Section 2305.11 (B)
begins with the words "in no event shall." These words put forth a
command that permits no discretion. 0 7  Second, in City of Cincinnati
v. Holmes'0 8 the supreme court held that when there is an irreconcil-
able conflict between two statutes, both referring to the same subject,
it is the latest expression of the legislature that is to be given full ef-
fect.
On the other side, the supreme court has stated that, in general,
statutes of limitation are to be narrowly construed.'0 9 Since § 2305.11
(B) does not specifically state that it modifies the saving clause or
the saving statute when a conflict arises, it can be argued that the
legislature intended that the saving clause and the saving statute
maintain full vitality. Furthermore, the saving statute is to be liberally
construed, for the statute is remedial and its purpose is to allow
controversies to be decided upon their merits." 0 The same argument
can be made on behalf of the saving clause. Also, the problem of a
103. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Page 1975).
104. Id. § 2305.19.
105. The saving clause is often employed when the plaintiff filch the complaint a few
days or weeks after the statutory time set for the cause of action, If it can be shown that the
defendant was absent from the state for any period, even if just for a vacation, then the
statute will be extended by the number of days that the defendant was absent from the state,
Wetzel v. Weyant, 41 Ohio St. 2d 135, 323 N.E.2d 711 (1975). See generalh' 37 OHIO St. ,I.
451 (1976).
106. See generally Note, Pitfalls Associated With the Oto Savitg Statute, 36 Olloi
ST. L.J. 876 (1975).
107. F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A STATEMENT AND EXI'MIION ()
THE GENERAL RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 107 (1953).
108. 56 Ohio St. 104, 46 N.E. 514 (1897).
109. Chisnell v. Ozier Co., 140 Ohio St. 355, 44 N.E.2d 464 (19)42),
110. Hershner v. Deibig, 64 Ohio App. 328, 28 N.E.2d 784 (1939).
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stale claim is not presented by a case recommenced under the saving
statute; since the first action was timely, the defendant had an op-
portunity to preserve evidence through depositions, physical examina-
tions, and other discovery devices while the claim was still fresh. A
court may also find that the equities favor the plaintiff under a situa-
tion governed by the saving clause when the defendant conceals him-
self. Thus, it appears that good arguments exist to resolve the con-
flicts either way.
3. Effect of§ 2305.11(B) on Termination Rule and Foreign
Object Discovery Rule
Section 2305.11(B) will probably have its greatest effect on the
judicially developed tolling devices-the termination rule and the for-
eign object discovery rule. If the phrase "in no event" is interpreted
to bar all malpractice claims four years after the alleged negligent act,
a patient who continues to be treated by the same physician will only
be given the benefit of the termination rule during the four years im-
mediately following the alleged negligent act. Similarly, the foreign
object discovery rule is useful only if the patient is fortunate enough to
discover the object and commence suit within four years from the
time that the doctor carelessly left the surgical instrument in the pa-
tient.
By using a theory of continuing negligence, it is possible to save
Ohio's foreign object discovery rule from the four-year bar of
§ 2305.11(B). The court might find this a desirable result since
Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic," was premised on the theory that in these
cases the major evidence cannot be stale. Section 2305.11(B) measures
the four-year outer limit from the date that the "alleged act or omis-
sion constituting malpractice occurred." The use of the singular
makes it appear that the legislature only contemplated malpractice
actions that were predicated upon a single negligent act or omission
and ignored the concept of continuing negligence as a basis for mal-
practice. In the recent case of Puro v. Henriy,'12 a Connecticut superior
court found that the doctor's negligent act of leaving a clamp in the
patient's body was a continuing tort. Connecticut's applicable statute
of limitations bars all malpractice actions "brought more than three
years from the date of the act or omission complained of."'"t3 Even
though a clamp was left in the plaintifrs body during a surgical opera-
tion in 1967, the court found that the action did not accrue until
October 1972 when the plaintiff discovered the negligence. The court
reasoned that the doctor's failure to warn of the dangerous condition
111. 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
112. 32 Conn. Super. 118, 342 A.2d 65 (1975).
113. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1976).
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was an act or omission that could continue until the patient dis-
covered the condition."
4
A similar interpretation of the facts underlying the Melnyk v.
Cleveland Clinic decision would save the Ohio foreign object dis-
covery rule and perhaps the physician-patient rule from the bar of
§ 2305.11(B). But notwithstanding the past tension between the legis-
lature and the supreme court over the malpractice statute of limita-
tions, it is doubtful that the Ohio Supreme Court will circumvent the
provisions of § 2305.11(B) by adopting the continuing negligence
rationale." 5 In Amer v. Akron City Hospital the court recognized
that § 2305.11(B) represented "a recent reappraisal by the General
Assembly of the policy of this state as to time limitations for com-
mencing malpractice actions."'" 6  The court recognized that § 2305.11
(B) was amendatory legislation. 17  When forced to choose between
two interpretations of an amendatory statute, one that would change
the pre-amendment law and one that would not, the court presumes
that the legislature intended to change the e'xisting law." 8  Since
adoption of the continuing negligence interpretation would lead to no
change in the substantive law, it probably will not be adopted by the
Ohio courts.
4. Effect of§ 2305.11(B) on Actions Stemming Indirectly
from Malpractice
It appears that § 2305.11(B) will also have some influence on the
court's disposition of actions not clearly governed by § 2305.11. In
Amer v. Akron City Hospital the court acknowledged that the plain-
tiff's cause of action was governed by § 2305.09(D), the four-year gen-
eral statute of limitations, since his action was for consequential dam-
ages stemming from the defendant's alleged malpractice upon the
114. See DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22. 31, 104 N.F.2d 177, 181 (1952) (Middle-
ton, J., dissenting): "Every day that the sponge remained in tfe body, added elements of
injury occurred. There was, in my judgment, a continuing tort and it cannot reasonably be
said under these circumstances that the cause of action 'accrued' at the date of the original
operation so as to start the running of the statute of limitations."
115. When the physician is guilty of consecutive affirmative acts of negligence, a court
starts the statute running from the time of the final act of nezligence. Gross v. Wise, 16
App. Div. 2d 682, 227 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1962). For example, when a patient receives too much
radiation during a series of treatments, the cause of action accrues on the date of the last
treatment, at least when that date is also the final contact between the physician and the
patient. See Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 89, 351 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1976),
This is to be differentiated from the Connecticut rationale, which finds one negligent act and
the events that occur after it to constitute continuing negligence.
116. 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 91, 351 N.E.2d 479, 484 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Malone v. Industrial Comm., 140 Ohio St. 292, 299, 43 N.E.2d 266, 270 (1942):
"When an existing statute is repealed and a new statute is enacted to include an amendment,
as in this case, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to change the effect and operation
of the law as to the extent of the change in the language thereof."
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plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff's action was commenced within four
years from the termination of his wife's professional relationship with
the doctor, but more than four years after the date of the negligent
act. The court refused to extend the termination rule to her husband
in this situation because the husband was not a party to the implied
contract between his spouse and her physician. "[A]s to [the husband]
no contractual duty of continuing care is imposed upon the physician
which is the base upon which the termination rule is structured."' 19
In dictum, the court buttressed this decision by citing the legis-
lature's recent enactment of § 2305.1 (B):
Whether the amendatory legislation § 2305.1 1(B) was prompted in part
by the holdings of this court with respect to time limitations for bringing
actions for consequential damges having their origin in asserted mal-
practice, such legislation represents a recent reappraisal by the General
Assembly of the policy of this state as to time limitations for commenc-
ing malpractice actions.120
While the court's reasoning in this part of the decision is unclear, it
appears that the court recognized the legislature's desire to bar all ac-
tions based on malpractice four years after the alleged negligent act
-even an action for consequential damages.
The court's use of § 2305.11(B) in Amer is troublesome since it
conflicts with the court's holding in Corpman v. Boyer.121  If, as held
in Corpman, the husband's action was totally separate from an action
for malpractice, how could the malpractice statute of limitations have
any bearing on the disposition of the situation in Amer? Perhaps the
court was merely saying that § 2305.1 1(B) was a legislative signal, tell-
ing the court to cease expanding the exceptions to the running of the
statute of limitations when the action was based directly or indirectly
upon an act of malpractice.
122
5. Possible Retroactive Effect of the Amended Statute
Finally, the application of the amended statute to malpractice
actions that originated in a negligent act committed prior to the effec-
tive date of the amended statute may also be problematic. First,
the law surrounding the retroactive application of amended statutes
is not well defined.12 Second, the retroactive application of an
119. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 89, 351 N.E.2d at 483.
120. Id. at 91, 351 N.E.2d at 484.
121. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960).
122. This same reluctance to expand the exceptions to the statute of limitations accounts
in part for the holding in Woodgeard v. Miami Valley Hosp. Soc., 47 Ohio Misc. 43 (C.P.
Montgomery Cty. 1975). The court refused to extend the foreign object discovery rule to a
situation in which the defendant physician closed a wound and failed to remove a piece of
shattered glass. Instead, the court limited Melnyk to situations in which forceps, instruments,
and other operating paraphernalia were left in the patient's body.
123. See Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 60, 290 N.E.2d 181. 189 (1972) (Leach,
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amended statute to a malpractice action is'made even more confusing
by the frequent time lag between the commission of the negligent act
and the initial running of the statute of limitations. Situations may
arise for which it is difficult to determine whether the pre-1975 mal-
practice statute of limitations or the amended statute governs.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. On May 5,
1973, A underwent an appendectomy at which time Doctor B negli-
gently left a clamp in A's body. Pursuant to the law in effect in 1973,
A could timely commence a malpractice suit against B within one year
from the time A discovered or reasonably should have discovered B's
negligence; the statute was tolled until A's discovery.124 On July 28,
1975, the effective date of the amended malpractice statute of limita-
tions, the statute provided that all malpractice suits would be barred
four years after the date of the negligent act.125 Suppose A discovers
B's negligence on May 5, 1978, and brings suit against B on June 5,
1978. If the statute in effect in 1973 governs, A's action is timely since
it was commenced within a year of discovery. If the amended statute
governs, then A's action is barred since it was not commenced within
four years of the negligent act. The effect of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.11(B) upon a cause of action having its origin in a negligent act
prior to the effective date of the amended statute is a very complicated
problem, which cannot be answered until the Ohio Supreme Court
resolves certain key issues. A three-part analysis may help to set forth
those key issues in this area.
First, did the legislature intend that the 1975 amendment be ap-
plied retroactively? Prior to 1972, Ohio Revised Code § 1.20126 gov-
erned the effect of an amended statute upon a cause of action that ac-
crued prior to the amended statute's effective date. Unless the action
had been commenced prior to the amendment, the amended statute was
applied retroactively to all causes of action, even those that accrued
prior to the amendment's effective date. 27  But § 1.20 was repealed in
1972 and replaced by Ohio Revised Code § 1.58, which states in part:
(A) The . . . amendment of a statute does not . . .
(1) Affect the prior operation of the statute or any action taken there-
under,
(2) Affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation or liability
previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder .... 12'
J., concurring); Note, The Retroactive Application of Ohio Statutes. 30 Oitto S-T. L.J. 401,
401 (1969).
124. Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
125, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
126. Act of February 19, 1866, 63 Ohio Laws 22 (repealed 1972).
127. Smith v. New York Cent. R.R., 122 Ohio St. 44 (1930); Elder v. Shoffstall, 90 Ohio
St. 265, 19 N.E. 437 (1914).
128. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Page Supp. 1975).
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Thus, under § 1.58 the legislature will be deemed not to have intended
by its amendment of § 2305.11 to affect any right of privilege acquired
prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Second, not only does § 1.58 forbid the retroactive application of
an amended statute to extinguish a right or privilege, but section 28,
article II of the Ohio Constitution states: "The General Assembly shall
have no power to pass retroactive laws . . . ." The ban against
retroactive legislation has traditionally been interpreted to apply to
substantive laws as opposed to procedural or remedial laws. 129 In
Gregory v. Flowers the supreme court recognized that the line between
procedural and substantive laws was difficult to draw. 130  Speaking
of statutes of limitations, the court stated that, "while such statutes
are procedural in the sense that they regulate the time within which
litigation must be commenced, they also smack of substance because
they operate to extinguish a party's accrued right to seek recovery."
1 31
In Flowers the plaintiff had been injured at work and was seeking
a modification of his workmen's compensation award. Between the
time the plaintiff's cause of action accrued and his action was com-
menced, the legislature shortened the applicable statute of limitations.
Under prior law the plaintiff's action was timely, but under the
amended law it was barred. The court held: "When the retroactive
application of a statute of limitation operates to destroy an accrued
substantive right, such application conflicts with Section 28, Article
II of the Ohio Constitution." 132 The court found that the plaintiff's
statutory right to modify his workmen's compensation award was an
"accrued substantive right." Whether this status inures to any cause
of action that is retroactively barred by an amended statute of limita-
tions remains unclear.
Third, even if it is found that a claim for malpractice is an accrued
substantive right, it is not clear whether the right exists at the time
of the negligent act or at the time the cause of action accrues, that is,
when the patient discovered or reasonably should have discovered the
doctor's negligence. In the hypothetical, was any substantive right
acquired by A before the effective date of the amended statute when
A had not yet discovered the doctor's negligence? Theoretically, A
had a right to sue from the date of the negligent occurrence. It can be
argued that under § 1.58 and article II, § 28 of the Ohio Constitution,
A's right cannot be abrogated by an amendatory statute.13 3  On the
129. Eg., Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 53, 290 N.E.2d 181, 186 (1972).
130. Id. at 55, 290 N.E.2d at 181.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 48, 290 N.E.2d at 181 (syllabus 3).
133. The concurring opinion of Justice Leach expressed the view that the legislature can
modify the statute of limitations and shorten the time in which a plaintiffs cause of action must
be brought; however, there must be a reasonable time after the amendment of the statute during
which the cause of action will be timely.
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other hand, it can be asserted that since A's right is conditioned upon
the discovery of the foreign object, his right to sue is too speculative
to come within the purview of these provisions.
III. THE DISCOVERY RULE: AN ANSWER TO THE UNFAIRNESS
AND RIDDLE OF OHIO'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
STATUTE OF LIMTATIONS
The Ohio General Assembly's amendment to the statute of limita-
tions for medical malpractice has made the time ripe for the judicial
adoption of the discovery rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio previous-
ly refused to adopt a general discovery rule because it felt that the
adoption of the rule involved a substantial change in the statute of
limitations and this change belonged in the domain of the legislature." 4
The recent enactment of Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11(B), placing an
outer limit of four years upon all actions for malpractice, represents
the legislature's most recent resolution of the rights of the patient,
physician, and the medical malpractice insurer.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the legislature retained
the language in § 2305.11(A) that an action for malpractice "shall be
brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued." 13  It may
be argued that since the legislature did not change the language of this
portion of the statute, the legislature impliedly approved the court's
prior interpretation of the word "accrued," thus approving the termina-
tion rule and foreign object discovery rule. This hypothesis is nothing
more than guesswork. If the legislature actually wanted to lock the
interpretation of "accrued" to the termination rule and foreign object
discovery rule, the legislature could have codified these interpretations
into the statute itself, as has been done by many state legislatures."IY
In the absence of such a codification these judicial interpretations of
the statute are subject to judicial change.
Thus, within the four-year limit of § 2305.11(B), it is still within
the province of the Ohio Supreme Court to interpret the word "ac-
crued" in a manner that will commence the statute of limitations in a
fair, consistent, and unambiguous manner for all Ohio plaintiffs.",
134. Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971); DeLong v. Campbell, 157
Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952). See section I.B. supra.
135. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A) (Page Supp. 1975).
136. The termination rule has been codified in the following states: Micii. CoN. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5805 (1968); N.Y. Civ. PkRc. LAW, § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1976). The foreign
object discovery rule has been codified in the following states: H B. 2001, § 5.1, Arizona Leg,
Service No. I, at 13-14 (codified at ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-564); CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 340,5
(West Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-1101 to 3-1105 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-219
(Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 83 § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN, § 614.1
(West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney SuPi. 1976), R.I. GtN. LAWS
§ 9-1-14 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415(a) (Supp. 1975).
137. That the court would like to do so seems apparent. See Mclnyk v. Cleveland Clinic,
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The discovery rule does just that. By adoption of the discovery rule
the plaintiffs cause of action would be barred one year after the plain-
tiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the defendant's
negligence, but in no event could the plaintiff maintain his action four
years after the negligent act.
Four reasons call for the adoption of the discovery rule, subject to
the four-year limit of § 2305.11(B): the ambiguities of the present
termination rule; the frequent inability of the termination rule to
mitigate the harshness of the one-year statute when the doctor's act
of malpractice takes longer to become ascertainable to the plaintiff;
the court's ability to adopt the discovery rule without frustrating the
most recent balancing of interests by the Ohio General Assembly; and
the weight of authority in other states favoring the adoption of the dis-
covery rule within specified outer limits.
First, because the court's formulation of the termination rule is
ambiguous, it is not clear whether the statute commences from the
date of the last treatment for the particular injury or condition or
from the date of the last contact between the physician and patient.1
3
The difficulty in determining the exact termination date also militates
against the continued application of the termination rule.' 39 The dis-
covery rule does not involve these complications. It simply starts the
running of the statute from the time the plaintiff discovered or reason-
ably should have discovered the doctor's negligence. When contro-
versy arises under the discovery rule concerning the reasonable date
of discovery, the jury simply reviews all relevant factors, including
the nature of the patient's physical symptoms and the treatments and
140
advice of the defendant-physician.
Second, the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged the basic un-
fairness of the termination rule when it is applied to patients whose
malpractice injuries take a longer period to develop.141  This
problem is most pronounced in malpractice actions based on a negli-
gent surgical operation. The surgeon is generally not the patient's
family physician and contact between the patient and surgeon is of-
ten very limited.1 42 In this situation the termination rule does not ex-
tend the running of the one-year statute of limitations for any appre-
ciable length of time from the date of the negligent act. This has
32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972); Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d164, 267 N.E.2d 419
(1971).
138. See section II.C.I. supra.
139. See section II.C.2. supra
140. See Rawlings v. Harris, 265 Cal. App. 2d 452,71 CaL Rptr. 288 (1968).
141. Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 168, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971).
142. See generally D. MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE (1976);
Mechanic, The Changing Structure of Medical Practice, 32 J. LAW & Co'mr. PRoB. 707 (1967);
Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE LU. 1179,
1182 (1975).
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the effect of commencing the malpractice statute of limitations on the
day of the negligent act or shortly thereafter, and forces the plaintiff
to discover the surgeon's negligence within a year of the operation or
else be barred from legal redress. If the malpractice injury takes a
long period to develop, it would be virtually impossible for these pa-
tients to discover and commence their suit within a year of the opera-
tion.
In Wyler v. Tripi the Ohio Supreme Court impliedly recognized
the "unconscionable" harshness of this result when the court criti-
cized the traditional interpretation of the world "accrued" in tort ac-
tions, which commenced the statute at the time of the negligent act.
143
What the court failed to note was the "unconscionability" of the
termination rule when the termination date is also the date of the
physician's negligent act or omission, or a date shortly thereafter. Un-
fortunately a significant number of Ohio plaintiffs are faced with this
problem because the majority of all malpractice actions arise from
surgical operations.
44
The discovery rule would remove the burden from those Ohio
plaintiffs whose injuries required a longer period of time to become as-
certainable. For this plaintiff, the statute would begin to run when
the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the doc-
tor's act of negligence, but in no event would the plaintiff be allowed
to bring his action four years after the date of the negligent act. 4 *
The timeliness of a plaintiff's cause of action would no longer hinge on
the fortuities of continuous treatment and the physician-patient ter-
mination date. Thus, the judiciary's adoption of the discovery rule
would also be a more uniform method of applying the statute of limita-
tions to malpractice actions.
Third, judicial adoption of the discovery rule would not frustrate
the will of the legislature. With the enactment of § 2305.11(B), the
plaintiff is barred from maintaining his action four years after the neg-
ligent act or omission, regardless of the date of discovery. Because
of § 2305.11(B), the legislature's concern for protecting defendants
from stale claims and its desire to provide medical insurers with ac-
tuarial certainty would not be frustrated by this move. Thus, the
provisions of § 2305.11(B), particularly its four year outside limit,
safeguard the legislature's balancing of the interests behind the statute
143. 25 Ohio St. at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
144. Statistics show that 57.2% of all malpractice claims stemmed from surgical operation,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 82. at 10.
145. A California study showed that 90.8% of all malpractice claims were discovered within
four years of the negligent act. Comment, A Four Year Statute of Limitation fi'r Medital Ala)-
practice: Will the Plaintiff's Case Be Barred? 2 PAC. L.J. 663. 672 nn.62-66 (1971). Thus, it
Ohio adopted a discovery rule with a four-year limit, the overwhelming malority of injured
plaintiffs would have an opportunity to find redress in the legal system.
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of limitations. They also make the change to the discovery rule less
severe.
Fourth, the court's adoption of the discovery rule would be in
line with the weight of authority throughout the country. The dis-
covery rule has finally emerged as the majority rule.146  But perhaps
the best indication of the discovery rule's ultimate fairness is shown
by its survival in the overwhelming number of states that have recently
amended their medical malpractice statutes of limitation in response
to the medical malpractice insurance crisis. In the last three years,
twenty-five -other state legislatures have amended their malpractice
statutes of limitation.1 47  Like Ohio, these legislatures have had to
add and weigh the medical malpractice insurance crisis into the statute
of limitations balance.
None of the legislatures overruled their highest court's adoption
of the discovery rule. Two-thirds of these states either affirmed their
highest state court's prior decision to adopt the discovery rule or
adopted the discovery rule at that time. 48  The majority of these legis-
146. Twelve states adopted some form of the discovery rule prior to 1973 and have not
amended their statute of limitations since 1973. COL. REv. STAT. § 13-80-105 (1971) (two
years from discovery, but within six years of negligent act); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584
(West Supp. 1976) (two years from discovery, but within three years of negligent act); DEL
CODE tit. 10, § 8119 (1975) (two years from date injury sustained) (see Layton v. Allen, 246
A.2d 794 (Del. 1968) in which the supreme court did not adopt the discovery rule as such, but
ruled that an injury is sustained under § 8119 when the harmful effect first manifests itself
and becomes physicially ascertainable); KY. REv. STAT. § 413.140 (1970) (see Tomlinson v.
Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970), in which discovery rule was judicially adopted), NEa. REv.
STAT. § 25-222 (1975) (two years from discovery, but within ten years of negligent act); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 24-14-2 (1937) (see Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563. (1973) in which
discovery rule was judicially adopted); OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 95 (1971) (see Lewis v. Owen. 395
F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1968) in which federal court under Erie doctrine determined that Oklahoma
courts followed the discovery rule generally; Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962). in which
court adopted the discovery rule for foreign objects); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (Purdon
Supp. 1971) (see Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. '282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) in which discovery rule
was judicially adopted); R.I. GEN LAWs § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1975) (see Wilkinson v. Harrington,
104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968), in which discovery rule was judicially adopted). TEX. Civ.
CODE ANN. tit. 91, § 5526 (1958) (see Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Sup. 1973) and Grady v.
Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), in which discovery rule was judicially adopted);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28 (Smith Supp. 1975) (two years from discovery, but within four years
of negligent act); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1966) (see Bishop v. Bryne. 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.
W. Va. 1967), in which federal court under Erie doctrine determined that West Virginia courts
followed the discovery rule generally; Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d
156 (1965), in which the court adopted discovery rule for foreign objects). For a list of those
states that have amended their malpractice statute of limitations since 1973 and follow the dis-
covery rule, see note 148 infra.
147. See notes 148 and 150 infra.
148. Seventeen states have amended their medical malpractice statute of limitations since
1973 and follow the discovery rule. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (Supp. 1976) (six months after
discovery but within four years of negligent act); CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp.
1976) (one year from discovery, but within three years of negligent act); FtA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11
(West Supp. 1976) (two years from discovery, but within four years of negligent act); Hw.
REv. STAT. § 657-7.3 (1975) (two years from discovery, but within six years of negligent
act); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976) (two years from discovery, but
within five years of negligent act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West Supp. 1976) (two years
from discovery, but within six years of negligent act); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5628 (West
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latures, however, placed outer limits on the discovery rule, facilitating
actuarial soundness for malpractice insurers and protecting defendants
from extremely stale claims. 49  Of the eight legislatures that did not
adopt the discovery rule, none were in states where the highest state
court had previously adopted the rule.
150
It is interesting to note that of these eight states, all have an
amended statutory limit of two years or longer.15' Even among those
states whose courts have not adopted a discovery rule or whose legis-
latures have not recently amended the statute, their statutes of limita-
tion are two years or longer.1 52  Therefore, from the plaintiff's per-
Supp. 1976) (one year from discovery, but within three years of negligent act); MD, Cis. & Jttn,
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (Supp. 1976) (three years from discovery, but within five years of
negligent act); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (Supp. 1976) (six months from discovery
or two years after termination of treatment); Miss. CODE ANN, § 15-1-36 (Supp, 1976) (two
years from discovery); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2624 (Supp. 1975) (three years from dis-
covery, but within five years of negligent act); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.400 (1975) (two years
from discovery but within four years of negligent act); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974)
(two years from discovery, but within six years of negligent act); OR. REV. STAT. § 12,110
(1975) (two years from discovery, but within five years of negligent act); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3415(a) (Supp. 1976) (one year from discovery, but within three years of negligent act):
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1976) (three years from di-covery); Sub. H.B. No. 1470,
ch. 56, § 1, [1976] Wash. Leg. Service No. 1, at 176 (codified at WAsH. RaV. CODE § 4.16,350)
(one year from discovery, but within eight years of negligent act).
149. Utah's medical malpractice statute of limitation exemplifies this type of statute,
It reads in part:
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occur-
rence . ..
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Interim Supp. 1976).
150. The Arizona legislature did overrule an intermediate appellate court's adoption
of the discovery rule. Compare Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hosp, 14 Ariz. App. 248, 482 P.2d
497 (1971) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-564 (West Supp. 1977).
Eight states have amended their medical malpractice statute of limitations since 1973 and
do not follow the discovery rule. H.B. 2001, § 5.1 [1976] West's Leg. Service No. 1, at 13-14,
(codified at ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-564) (three years from date of injury); GA. CODU ANN.
§§ 3-1101 to 3-1103 (Supp. 1976) (two years from wrongful act); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1
(Bums Supp. 1975) (two years from wrongful act); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (Miehie
Law Co-op Supp. 1976) (three years after cause of action accrues), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-18
(Interim Supp. 1976) (three years from wrongful act); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney
Supp. 1976) (two and one half years after wrongful act or termination of treatment); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-14.1 (Supp. 1976) (three years from negligent act); VA. CODE
§ 8-24 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (two years after cause of action accrues).
151. See Note 150, supra.
152. Twelve states have not amended their medical malpractice statute of limitations
since 1973 and have a statute of two years duration or longer. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10,070
(1962) (two years from negligent act); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-205 (1962) (two years from wrong-
ful act); IDAHO CODE § 5-219 (Supp. 1976) (two years from act or omission); KAN, STAT.
§ 60-513 (Supp. 1975) (two years from time cause of action zccrues); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
585.14 § 753 (1965) (two years from time cause of action accrues). MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1945)
(two years from time cause of action accrues); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.140 (1969) (two years from
act of neglect complained of); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508: 4 (Supp. 1973) (six years from
time cause of action accrues); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (Supp. 1975) (three years from time
cause of action accrues); S.C. CODE § 10-142 (1952) (six years from time cause of action ac-
crues); Wis. STAT. §§ 330.19(5), 893.19 (1973) (must give notice of injury within two years of
negligent act); WY. STAT. § 1-18 (1959) (four years from time cause of action accrues).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
spective, Ohio undoubtedly has one of the harshest malpractice statutes
of limitation in the country.
The discovery rule has emerged as the majority rule in this coun-
try largely through state supreme courts' interpretation of their stat-
utes.153  These courts have taken the initial step by finding that a
cause of action for malpractice "accrued" when the plaintiff discov-
ered or reasonably should have discovered the doctor's act of mal-
practice. The Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of the foreign object
discovery rule in Melnyk shows that it, too, has been willing to take
action in this area. It is well within the Ohio Supreme Court's au-
thority to adopt the discovery rule and add Ohio to the growing list of
states that subscribe to this more equitable rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
The medical malpractice insurance crisis added two new ele-
ments into the balance underlying the medical malpractice statute of
limitations: the need for actuarial certainty and the desire for a reduc-
tion in the overall number of malpractice suits decided on their merits.
The amended statute reflects these concerns in § 2305.11(B), which
cuts off all medical malpractice claims four years after the doctor's
negligent act or omission. This cut-off will most probably occur re-
gardless of the tolling effects of the termination rule and the foreign
object discovery rule. It may even occur regardless of the tolling ef-
fects of the saving clause and saving statute. The retroactive appli-
cation of the amended statute probably hinges upon whether the Ohio
Supreme Court finds that the amendment extinguishes an accrued
substantive right.
The amended statute did not stamp its approval upon the court's
prior interpretation of the word "accrued" in § 2305.11(A). By not
codifying the termination rule and the foreign object discovery rule,
the legislature left the word "accrued" open to interpretation. This
Note has urged that, subject to the four-year limit of § 2305.11(B),
the Ohio Supreme Court should adopt the discovery rule, i.e., that a
cause of action for malpractice must be brought one year after the
plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the physi-
cian's negligent act. The court's adoption of the discovery rule would
rid Ohio law of the inequitable and ambiguous termination rule. Be-
153. Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp.. 433
P.2d 220 (Haw. 1967); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Springer v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 169 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1964); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d
825 (1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785, (1963); Grey v. Silver Bow
County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.
1968); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421
P.2d 996 (1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Wilkinson v. Harrington,
243 A.2d 745 (R.I. 1968); Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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cause the absolute four-year limitation of § 2305.11(B) safeguards the
legislature's balancing of interests between patient, doctor, and mal-
practice insurer, the adoption of the discovery rule would not frus-
trate the will of the legislature. Furthermore, the discovery rule is in
line with the weight of authority in this country.
The time is ripe for the adoption of the discovery rule. As Jus-
tice Celebrezze recently wrote in his dissent in Amer v. Akron Cily
Hospital: "How can anyone be precluded from asserting a claim by a
statute of limitations which expires before the discovery of the injury?
How can anyone charged with the responsibility of administering
justice allow such an absurdity?"' 154 The logic of the discovery rule
alone is reason enough for its adoption.
David P. Miraldi
154. Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 93, 351 N.E.2d 479, 485 (1976).
